Summary
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Mary Djurasevic’s motion to join claims brought in her individual, trustee, and executor capacities in a mortgage foreclosure action. The court held that causes of action asserted in individual and representative capacities are separate rights that cannot be joined in a single suit, and that the trial court was not required to allow Djurasevic to elect a capacity after she had initially sued only as trustee.
Holdings
- A cause of action accruing to a plaintiff individually may not be joined with a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff in a representative capacity merely because both arise from the same transaction or occurrence, because the claims are not brought in the same right.
- The trial court was not required to afford Djurasevic a choice of the capacity in which to sue because the circumstances did not fall within the holding of Department of Insurance of the State of Florida v. Coopers & Lybrand.
Questions Presented
- Whether a plaintiff may join claims asserted in individual and representative capacities when the claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence but accrue in different legal rights.
- Whether the trial court was required to allow Djurasevic to elect the capacity in which she would proceed after denying her motion to join additional capacities.
Disposition
affirmed
Cases Cited (4)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Hicks, 323 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)(followed)
- Pensacola Elec. Co. v. Soderlind, 53 So. 722, 724 (Fla. 1910)(followed)
- Miami Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Tinsley, 155 So. 850, 851 (Fla. 1934)(followed)
- Dep't of Ins. of the State of Fla. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 570 So. 2d 369, 370-71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(distinguished)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
Open PDFLoading document…