United States v. York; United States v. Robinson

Summary

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of Perry York and Peter Andrew Robinson for armed credit-union robbery and related firearm offenses. The court rejected claims involving entrapment, government misconduct, firearm operability, the effective date of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), use of Robinson's confession for impeachment, sentencing information, other-crimes evidence, an ex parte jury communication, and prosecutorial comment on York's silence.

Holdings

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding duplicative FBI administrative reports or by refusing proposed instructions declaring Quinn a government agent as a matter of law and imposing general responsibility on the government for his conduct.
2. The entrapment issue was properly submitted to the jury, and the government's conduct did not violate due process or constitute conduct so outrageous that the convictions were barred as a matter of public policy.
3. A firearm need not be operable to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3); it is sufficient that the weapon was designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.
4. An unloaded or inoperable gun may constitute a dangerous weapon for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).
5. The 1984 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) became effective on October 12, 1984, the date of enactment, because no explicit contrary effective date applied to that amendment.
6. Robinson could not obtain reversal based on use of his September 12 confession after he first elicited testimony about it and used it to support his entrapment or coercion theory.
7. The sentencing court properly considered hearsay and unprosecuted criminal activity because York had an opportunity to explain or rebut the information, and the court substantially complied with Rule 32(c)(3)(D).
8. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of York's other robberies because the evidence satisfied the clear-and-convincing requirement, was sufficiently probative, and was relevant to entrapment, predisposition, knowledge, intent, and common scheme or plan.
9. Although the trial court's communication with the jury in the absence of York and counsel was improper and presumptively prejudicial, the presumption was overcome because the court referred the jury to a neutral, correct aiding-and-abetting instruction and there was no reasonable possibility of prejudice.
10. The prosecutor's comment was properly understood as referring to York's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, not protected post-arrest silence, and any potential confusion concerning the right not to testify was cured by the trial court's immediate admonition.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the district court improperly excluded FBI administrative reports and related jury instructions concerning informant Quinn's agency and the government's responsibility for his conduct.
2. Whether the government's use of Quinn and his solicitation of the defendants violated due process or required adoption of a probable-cause prerequisite for government-created criminal opportunities.
3. Whether the handgun was a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) despite being inoperable and whether it was a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).
4. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), as amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, was effective when applied to the September 1985 robbery.
5. Whether Robinson's allegedly involuntary confession was properly used after Robinson first introduced evidence concerning it.
6. Whether the district court properly considered uncorroborated hearsay and unprosecuted criminal activity at York's sentencing and complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D).
7. Whether evidence of York's other robberies was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
8. Whether the trial court's ex parte response to a jury question was prejudicial.
9. Whether the prosecutor improperly commented on York's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.

Disposition

affirmed