Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Locke Thompson

Summary

**Eighth Circuit | First Amendment – Commercial Speech | Missouri Meat Labeling Law | Preliminary Injunction | Standing** The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against a Missouri statute criminalizing the misrepresentation of plant-based products as meat. The court held that the plaintiffs (Tofurky and Good Food Institute) failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because their labels clearly disclosed the products were plant-based, vegan, or vegetarian, and thus were not misleading under the statute. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing and their pre-enforcement First Amendment claim was ripe, but the "arguably proscribed" standard from *Susan B. Anthony List* applies only to standing, not to the merits of a commercial speech challenge under *Central Hudson*.

Holdings

1. Plaintiffs have standing because they allege an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by the Statute and there is a credible threat of prosecution. The claim is ripe because it presents a legal question and involves the chill of protected expression.
2. The district court correctly applied the Central Hudson test for commercial speech, not the Susan B. Anthony List standard, which governs standing, not merits.
3. On the limited record, the district court did not err in concluding that the Statute does not prohibit Plaintiffs' speech because the labels submitted clearly indicate that the products are plant-based, so they are not misrepresenting their products as meat.
4. Because Plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success on the merits, they also failed to show irreparable harm, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the injunction on that basis.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Plaintiffs have standing and their claim is ripe for review.
2. Whether the district court applied the wrong legal standard (Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus) in evaluating likelihood of success on the merits of the First Amendment claim.
3. Whether the district court interpreted the scope of the Statute too narrowly when determining that the Statute does not prohibit Plaintiffs' speech.

Disposition

affirmed