Robert H. Morast v. T. Bertram Lance

Summary

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Robert Morast's claims arising from his termination as an officer of a federally chartered bank after he reported an allegedly irregular banking transaction to the Comptroller of the Currency. The court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, Bivens, 12 U.S.C. § 93, federal and Georgia RICO statutes, and related Georgia causes of action, concluding that the claims lacked jurisdictional or substantive grounds.

Holdings

1. The fact that the defendant was a federally chartered bank did not itself confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction; jurisdiction required a claim presenting a federal question.
2. A national-bank officer is not, merely by virtue of that position, a person holding an office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States for purposes of § 1985(1).
3. Morast's alleged retaliation did not state a § 1985(2) claim because his testimony was before an administrative agency rather than a federal court, he did not allege force, intimidation, or threat, and his at-will discharge did not constitute an actual injury protected by the statute.
4. Because Morast could not establish a viable § 1985 conspiracy claim, he could not maintain a derivative § 1986 claim.
5. The alleged discharge did not support a Bivens claim because the private defendants did not act under color of federal law.
6. Morast could not maintain a claim under 12 U.S.C. § 93 because he suffered no actionable injury in consequence of a banking-law violation and lacked standing to assert an implied private right of action for retaliatory discharge.
7. Morast lacked standing to pursue a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 because his discharge was not an injury flowing directly from the alleged predicate banking violations.
8. The Georgia RICO claim failed for the same reasons as the federal RICO claim because the Georgia and federal RICO statutes were essentially identical.
9. The defendants could not be liable for tortious interference with Morast's employment at NGCS because the bank controlled the wholly owned subsidiary and the bank's directors were not third parties to the employment relationship; the board also possessed authority to terminate him.
10. The court declined to create a public-policy exception to Georgia's at-will employment doctrine.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Morast's status as an officer of a federally chartered bank supplied federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
2. Whether the alleged retaliation stated claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(1), 1985(2), and 1986.
3. Whether Morast could maintain a Bivens action against the private defendants for alleged First and Fifth Amendment violations.
4. Whether 12 U.S.C. § 93 provided a private remedy or standing for Morast's alleged retaliatory discharge.
5. Whether the alleged discharge caused an injury sufficient to support a federal or Georgia RICO claim.
6. Whether the Georgia claims for tortious interference with employment rights and violation of public policy were viable.

Disposition

affirmed