Summary
This law review article critiques the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in *Egelhoff v. Egelhoff* (2001) and *Hillman v. Maretta* (2013), which held that ERISA and FEGLIA preempt state divorce‑revocation statutes for beneficiary designations, even though the federal laws are silent on divorce revocation. The author argues that these rulings undermine the core state‑law policy of implementing transferor intent and that the Court’s extension of preemption to bar post‑distribution unjust‑enrichment claims against ex‑spouses is unjustified. The article also highlights the tension with the universally recognized slayer rule and suggests that federal common law should preserve both divorce‑revocation and slayer rules to prevent contradictory outcomes.
Holdings
- ERISA preempts state divorce revocation statutes because such statutes require plan administrators to pay benefits to beneficiaries chosen by state law rather than those identified in plan documents, interfering with nationally uniform plan administration.
- Post-distribution state-law claims against ex-spouses are preempted under FEGLIA because Congress intended that insurance proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and that the beneficiary can use them.
Disposition
other
Cases Cited (10)
- Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, a minor, by and through her natural parent, Breiner, et al., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001)(critical)
- Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013)(critical)
- Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950)(critical)
- Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981)(critical)
- Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009)(neutral)
- Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc., 674 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2012)(abrogated)
- Andochick v. Byrd, 709 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2013)(abrogated)
- Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1985)(followed)
- Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886)(followed)
- De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956)(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.