Julia Prewitt Brown v. Trustees of Boston University

Summary

The First Circuit reviewed a sex-discrimination and breach-of-contract action arising from Boston University’s denial of tenure to an assistant professor. The court affirmed the findings of liability and the award of tenure, concluding that comparative evidence supported the jury’s finding that the University had manifestly applied unequal tenure standards. It also addressed evidentiary rulings, jurisdiction, and the scope of the anti-discrimination injunction.

Holdings

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence comparing Brown's qualifications and tenure support with those of other faculty members, because the evidence was relevant to whether the University's stated reasons were pretextual and was sufficiently compelling to permit a finding of manifestly unequal treatment.
2. Evidence of President Silber's comments and conduct concerning another female tenure candidate was admissible as probative of discriminatory motive, but evidence consisting of Silber's later speech about working mothers and the Dean's views about the Women's Studies program was improperly admitted; those errors were harmless.
3. The jury instructions, considered as a whole, properly required Brown to prove that sex discrimination was a but-for cause of the University's denial of tenure; references to a decision being 'tainted' did not confuse or mislead the jury.
4. The district court properly exercised pendent jurisdiction over the contract claim because it arose from the same nucleus of operative fact as Brown's Title VII claim.
5. The University waived its argument that the agreement precluded judicial review of tenure decisions by failing to raise that specific argument before or during trial.
6. Once the University was found to have denied tenure because of sex, the district court could award Brown tenure as the most complete make-whole remedy, even though the University disputed her qualifications.
7. The injunction was overbroad insofar as it prohibited sex discrimination against Boston University faculty generally, because Brown had not established a classwide violation or a need for relief benefiting nonparties; the injunction was proper insofar as it protected Brown from future discrimination or retaliation.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting comparative tenure evidence and evidence of alleged discriminatory attitudes by university officials.
2. Whether the jury instructions correctly required proof that sex discrimination was a but-for cause of the tenure denial and adequately limited the jury's role.
3. Whether the district court had jurisdiction to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Brown's contract claim after the NLRB determined that Boston University faculty were supervisors rather than employees under the National Labor Relations Act.
4. Whether the collective bargaining agreement created an enforceable right to a discrimination-free tenure decision.
5. Whether awarding Brown tenure was an appropriate Title VII remedy despite disputed evidence concerning her qualifications.
6. Whether the injunction prohibiting sex discrimination against Boston University faculty other than Brown was impermissibly overbroad.

Disposition

other