Summary
The First Circuit held that a Massachusetts conviction for armed assault with intent to murder qualifies as a "crime of violence" under USSG §4B1.2(a) even if based on a joint venture theory, because Application Note 1 properly includes aiding and abetting within the definition and Massachusetts joint venture liability requires the same mens rea as aiding and abetting. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the commentary impermissibly expanded the guideline, and concluded that the district court erred in declining to apply the career-offender enhancement under §4B1.1(a). The case was remanded for resentencing consistent with this ruling.
Holdings
- The definition of 'crime of violence' under §4B1.2(a) includes aiding and abetting as listed in Application Note 1.
- Massachusetts joint venture liability requires the same mens rea as aiding and abetting, so a conviction under a joint venture theory qualifies as a crime of violence.
Questions Presented
- Whether the definition of 'crime of violence' under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a) includes aiding and abetting, as stated in Application Note 1.
- Whether Massachusetts joint venture liability as it stood in 2007 requires a mens rea different from the aiding and abetting liability referred to in Application Note 1, such that a conviction under a joint venture theory does not qualify as a crime of violence.
Disposition
vacated
Cases Cited (5)
- United States v. Lewis, 963 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2020)(followed)
- United States v. Capelton, 966 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020)(followed)
- United States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017)(followed)
- United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 617–19 (1st Cir. 1994)(followed)
- United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 2–4 (1st Cir. 1992)(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.