Pamela L. Owens, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William A. Owens v. Crescent Hill Partners, LLC, and Raymond Martin

Summary

The Massachusetts Superior Court addresses standing, motions to strike, and summary judgment in an estate representative’s claims concerning an alleged joint venture or partnership, contractual rights, unpaid wages, unjust enrichment, and G.L. c. 93A. The court finds that the plaintiff’s appointment as special personal representative cures any standing defect, strikes a declaration lacking competent foundation and containing hearsay, and denies a motion to strike an SEC Form ADV. Summary judgment is allowed on declaratory-relief, Wage Act, minimum-wage, and Chapter 93A claims, but denied on the alleged joint venture or partnership, contract, and unjust-enrichment claims.

Holdings

1. The Probate Court's appointment of Plaintiff as Special Personal Representative with authority to collect and manage estate assets cured any defect in her standing to prosecute the claims.
2. The Reen declaration could not be considered in support of summary judgment because it was not properly sworn, lacked a foundation establishing personal knowledge or competency, contained inadmissible hearsay, and included inadmissible lay opinions.
3. The court could take judicial notice of the March 2014 Form ADV filed with the SEC and consider it solely for purposes of deciding the summary judgment motion.
4. Summary judgment was not warranted on the joint venture, partnership, fiduciary-duty, or accounting claims because a reasonable jury could find that Owens and Martin, directly or through Crescent Hill Partners, agreed to form a joint venture or partnership and to share profits and losses.
5. Crescent Hill Partners, LLC could form a partnership or, by analogy, a joint venture with a natural person such as Owens.
6. Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the Independent Contractor Agreement declaratory claim, the Wage Act claim, and the Minimum Wage Act claim because the undisputed evidence showed that CHP paid Owens the full $75,168.33 he invoiced for 2020, and the alleged 1,600 hours produced an hourly rate well above the statutory minimum wage.
7. Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the unjust-enrichment claim because Plaintiff's testimony created a triable issue as to whether Defendants were unjustly enriched by Owens's payment of half the rent for CHP's office.
8. Plaintiff waived any opposition to summary judgment on the G.L. c. 93A claim by failing to present an argument against that aspect of Defendants' motion in her written opposition.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Plaintiff had standing to prosecute the estate's claims after the Probate Court appointed her Special Personal Representative.
2. Whether the Victoria Reen declaration was competent and admissible evidence for purposes of summary judgment.
3. Whether the court could consider and take judicial notice of the SEC Form ADV submitted as exhibit 25.
4. Whether a reasonable jury could find that Owens and Martin, directly or through Crescent Hill Partners, formed a joint venture or partnership.
5. Whether Crescent Hill Partners, an LLC, could form a partnership or joint venture with Owens.
6. Whether Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the contract, unjust-enrichment, declaratory-judgment, Wage Act, Minimum Wage Act, and G.L. c. 93A claims.

Disposition

other