Summary
The Massachusetts Superior Court denied Theodore Lampros’s motion for a preliminary injunction barring Innovive Health of Massachusetts LLC from disposing of assets outside the ordinary course of business and for $9.7 million in trustee process attachments. The court held that Lampros had not shown irreparable harm or established the likelihood of recovering more than $9.7 million, and that equitable relief resembling a creditor’s bill was unavailable because he was not yet a judgment creditor. The court also vacated the temporary restraining order entered on February 18, 2026.
Holdings
- A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish irreparable harm absent the injunction and that the harm to the plaintiff outweighs likely irreparable harm to the defendants. Lampros failed to show a real risk that Innovive would be unable to satisfy a future judgment and therefore was not entitled to the injunction.
- A court may not use its general equity jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in the nature of a creditor's bill attachment before the plaintiff becomes a judgment creditor with a final and enforceable judgment, absent an asserted lien or equitable interest in particular assets.
- Trustee process attachments may be approved only when the plaintiff establishes a reasonable likelihood of recovering a judgment, including interest and costs, at least equal to the amount of available liability insurance plus the amount sought to be attached. Lampros did not meet that burden for the requested $9.7 million attachment.
Questions Presented
- Whether Lampros was entitled to a preliminary injunction restricting Innovive's use or disposition of its assets based on an asserted risk that Innovive would be unable to pay a future damages judgment.
- Whether the court could grant equitable relief in the nature of a creditor's bill before Lampros obtained a final and enforceable judgment.
- Whether Lampros established the reasonable likelihood of recovering at least $9.7 million, including prejudgment interest and costs, necessary for trustee process attachments.
- Whether traditional equitable considerations such as irreparable harm, balancing of harms, and the public interest governed the requested trustee process attachments.
Disposition
other
Cases Cited (18)
- American Grain Products Processing Institute v. Department of Pub. Health, 392 Mass. 309, 326–329 (1984)(followed)
- Nolan v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 383 Mass. 625, 630 (1981)(followed)
- Cavadi v. DeYeso, 458 Mass. 615, 625 (2011)(followed)
- First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Nichols, 294 Mass. 173, 182–183 (1936)(followed)
- Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 52 (1928)(followed)
- Foster v. Evans, 384 Mass. 687, 693–694 (1981)(followed)
- Consolidated Ordnance Co. v. Marsh, 227 Mass. 15, 23 (1917)(followed)
- In re Rare Coin Galleries of America, Inc., 862 F.2d 896, 904–905 (1st Cir. 1988)(applied)
- Hunter v. Youthstream Media Networks, 241 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55–57 (2002)(applied)
- Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 310, 333 (1999)(followed)
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Court Document
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