Commonwealth v. Duran

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, juror misconduct, and cumulative error. It also found no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice from counsel’s unfulfilled opening-statement promise that the defendant would testify or from the malice instruction.

Holdings

1. The defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to investigate because the record did not show what counsel's investigative decisions were or identify information that further investigation would likely have uncovered and that would have influenced the jury.
2. Counsel was not ineffective for selecting and using the inconsistencies most beneficial to the misidentification defense, rather than pursuing every possible inconsistency or impeaching a witness with relatively minor prior convictions and pending charges.
3. The defendant was not denied effective assistance when counsel declined to use a peremptory challenge against a juror who worked as a correctional officer at the facility where the defendant was housed.
4. The cumulative effect of the alleged errors did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
5. The defendant was not entitled to a new trial because he failed to establish that the juror was actually biased as a result of dishonestly answering a material voir dire question.
6. An unfulfilled promise in opening statement that the defendant will testify is not automatically ineffective assistance; relief requires a showing that the promise created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. On this record, the defendant did not make that showing.
7. Although the judge instructed on the first and second prongs of malice even though deliberate premeditation was the only theory supporting first-degree murder, the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

Questions Presented

1. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate potentially favorable witnesses.
2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach eyewitnesses with every alleged prior inconsistency, pending charges, and prior convictions.
3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to exercise a peremptory challenge against a juror who worked as a correctional officer at the facility where the defendant was housed.
4. Whether the cumulative effect of alleged counsel errors created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
5. Whether the juror dishonestly answered a material voir dire question and was actually biased, requiring a new trial.
6. Whether counsel's unfulfilled opening-statement promise that the defendant would testify required a new trial or otherwise created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
7. Whether the trial judge's instruction on the first and second prongs of malice, when only deliberate premeditation supported first-degree murder, created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
8. Whether the court should exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or order a new trial.

Disposition

affirmed