Commonwealth v. Denis

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to rob, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The court rejected challenges to the jury instructions, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the denial of a motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing. The court also declined to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Holdings

1. The reasonable-doubt instruction did not create a substantial likelihood that the jury would convict on proof insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt. The contextual use of moral certainty, the admonition concerning proof beyond a shadow of a doubt, and the examples of what reasonable doubt was not did not constitute reversible error.
2. Although the judge improperly included second-prong malice in the definition of malice, the correct and repeated instruction that deliberate premeditation requires an intent to kill prevented any substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
3. The judge was not required to give an explicit instruction prohibiting the jury from considering consciousness-of-guilt evidence in connection with deliberate premeditation.
4. Trial counsel was not ineffective. Counsel's strategic concessions and decision to pursue second-degree murder rather than first-degree-murder theories or manslaughter were not manifestly unreasonable in light of the overwhelming evidence, and the defendant failed to show that other alleged errors likely influenced the verdict.
5. The motion judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing because the motion and supporting materials failed to present sufficient credible information to raise a substantial issue.
6. The defendant's request that police contact his former high school guidance counselor was not a clear and unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue suppression on that theory.
7. There was no basis to order a new trial or reduce the first-degree-murder verdict under the court's § 33E powers.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the reasonable-doubt instruction, including references to moral certainty, proof beyond a shadow of a doubt, and examples of what reasonable doubt was not, created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
2. Whether the instructions on deliberate premeditation were erroneous because the definition of malice included second-prong malice and because the jury was not expressly instructed not to use postshooting conduct in determining premeditation.
3. Whether the identification instruction and the judge's use of fact-related illustrations improperly affected the jury's fact-finding role.
4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective by making strategic concessions, failing to expressly request a second-degree-murder verdict, inadequately challenging mask-related testimony, failing to investigate or pursue certain motions, or failing to seek suppression on additional right-to-counsel grounds.
5. Whether the motion judge abused his discretion by denying the motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.
6. Whether relief should be granted under G. L. c. 278, § 33E by ordering a new trial or reducing the first-degree-murder verdict.

Disposition

affirmed