Commonwealth v. Delacruz

Summary

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Jose Delacruz’s convictions for murder in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm. The court rejected claims concerning denial of counsel of choice, suppression of statements obtained after an out-of-State arrest, and jury instructions regarding mental impairment, and found no basis for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Holdings

1. The pretrial judge did not abuse his discretion by maintaining the May 12, 2009, trial date, which effectively denied the defendant's informal request for a continuance to obtain different counsel.
2. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to allow the defendant to discharge appointed counsel immediately before the jury were sworn.
3. The Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Delacruz knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that his statements were voluntary.
4. The defendant's statements were not rendered involuntary by the delay in arraignment because he executed an informed and voluntary written waiver of his right to be arraigned without unreasonable delay, and the circumstances did not violate the spirit of the Rosario rule.
5. The judge was not required to repeat the portion of the main charge explaining how mental impairment bore on deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty when answering the jury's more specific questions about the definitions of those offenses.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the denial of a continuance to permit substitution of privately retained counsel violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice or his right to effective assistance and due process.
2. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing, on the first day of trial, to permit the defendant to discharge appointed counsel.
3. Whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and whether his statements were otherwise voluntary.
4. Whether delay in arraignment and the defendant's out-of-State arrest rendered his statements involuntary under the principles of Commonwealth v. Rosario.
5. Whether the judge was required to reinstruct the jury on the relevance of mental impairment after the jury asked about deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.
6. Whether the defendant was entitled to relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Disposition

affirmed