Commonwealth v. Almonte

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviews Christian Almonte’s convictions for murder in the first degree and larceny of a motor vehicle. The defendant challenged the partial denial of his motion to suppress, prosecutorial remarks, DNA testimony and argument, limits on cross-examination, homicide evidence, sufficiency of the evidence, and relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its extraordinary power under § 33E.

Holdings

1. The search warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the defendant's apartment for evidence of a separate armed robbery, and the invalid portion concerning evidence of the homicide was severable from the valid portion.
2. The judge was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the sock was bloody.
3. The prosecutor's statement that the defendant murdered Escobar was not improper personal opinion.
4. The DNA analyst's comment that the results concerning whether Escobar contributed to blood found on the defendant's hands could 'go either way' should have been stricken, but its admission did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
5. The prosecutor improperly stated that Escobar was the only tested person who could not be excluded as a contributor to blood on the defendant's hands, but the remark did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
6. The court declined to adopt the broader Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) approach permitting routine cross-examination about specific acts of misconduct to attack veracity, and affirmed the limitation of the defendant's cross-examination.
7. Admission of the death certificate identifying the manner of death as homicide did not warrant reversal because there was no dispute that the death was a homicide.
8. The evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant murdered Escobar and stole his automobile.
9. The court declined to exercise its extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to set aside or reduce the murder conviction.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the warrant affidavit established probable cause to search the defendant's apartment for evidence of an armed robbery and whether the bloodstained sock was properly seized despite the absence of probable cause linking the apartment to the homicide.
2. Whether the trial judge was required to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning whether the seized sock was actually bloody.
3. Whether the prosecutor's opening statement improperly expressed a personal opinion that the defendant committed the murder.
4. Whether admission of a DNA analyst's nonresponsive explanation that the inconclusive results could 'go either way,' and the prosecutor's closing argument concerning the DNA results, created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
5. Whether the defendant should have been permitted to cross-examine a witness about the specific facts of prior misconduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b).
6. Whether admission of an unredacted death certificate identifying the manner of death as homicide was prejudicial error.
7. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the murder conviction.
8. Whether relief was warranted under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Disposition

affirmed