Commonwealth v. Christopher J. Kennedy

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Christopher J. Kennedy's convictions for indecent assault and battery, assault and battery, and indecent exposure. The court held that the trial judge properly declined to instruct the jury on mistake of fact, properly admitted first complaint and investigative evidence, and did not abuse discretion in denying challenges for cause to two prospective jurors. The opinion addresses consent, mens rea, first complaint evidence, voir dire, and juror impartiality.

Holdings

1. A defendant charged with indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen may, in an appropriate case, be entitled to a mistake-of-fact instruction concerning consent, but no such instruction was warranted here because the victim gave clear and unambiguous indications of nonconsent that the defendant ignored.
2. The defendant was not entitled to a mistake-of-fact instruction on indecent exposure because the offense requires intentional exposure of the genitalia, not an intent to offend, and the defendant's belief that M.M. would not be offended did not negate a required mental state.
3. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the victim's friend's first complaint testimony, and admission of the police officers' testimony concerning how exhibits were obtained did not violate the first complaint doctrine.
4. A trial judge has considerable discretion to conduct follow-up questioning after attorney-conducted voir dire and may deny a challenge for cause when the prospective juror affirmatively demonstrates an ability to set aside personal opinions and decide the case impartially.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the defendant was entitled to mistake-of-fact jury instructions for indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen and indecent exposure.
2. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting first complaint testimony from the victim's friend and investigative testimony from police officers.
3. Whether the trial judge erred by refusing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause after conducting follow-up questioning concerning potential bias.

Disposition

affirmed