Commonwealth v. Martin

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed James Anthony Martin’s conviction of murder in the first degree and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court rejected his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, declined to apply retroactively the court’s revised felony-murder rule from Commonwealth v. Brown, and found no prejudicial error in the denial of requested manslaughter instructions. The court also declined to exercise its extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the conviction.

Holdings

1. Counsel's decision to tell the jury that Brown would testify, despite counsel's knowledge that the prosecutor had not decided whether to call him and counsel's own lack of intent to call him, was manifestly unreasonable. However, the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because it was not reasonably likely to have influenced the verdict.
2. Commonwealth v. Brown did not apply retroactively to the defendant's case. Brown changed Massachusetts substantive common law by prospectively altering the felony-murder rule; it did not announce a new Federal constitutional rule or a new Federal rule of criminal procedure.
3. The trial judge erred by refusing the defendant's requested instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, because the evidence viewed favorably to the defendant could have supported accidental killing, heat of passion arising from reasonable provocation, or sudden combat. The error was not prejudicial.
4. No error occurred when the judge failed to instruct on second-degree felony-murder based on uncharged felonies where no party requested the instruction or brought the issue to the judge's attention at trial.

Questions Presented

1. Whether defense counsel's opening statement and alleged inadequate preparation deprived the defendant of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
2. Whether Commonwealth v. Brown, which changed Massachusetts felony-murder doctrine, applied retroactively to a case tried before Brown but pending on appeal when Brown was decided.
3. Whether the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
4. Whether the court should exercise its extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the conviction to second-degree murder.
5. Whether the trial judge was required to instruct on second-degree felony-murder predicated on uncharged felonies.

Disposition

affirmed