United States v. Joseph Alexander Armstrong

Summary

The Ninth Circuit held that aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) is implied in every federal indictment, even when the indictment specifically charges causing under § 2(b); thus, the government's use of an aiding-and-abetting theory did not impermissibly amend the superseding indictment. The court also found no plain error in the jury instructions, which included the statutory language and implied that someone else must have committed the underlying offense, and that the district court properly denied a mistrial based on juror misconduct because the trial judge's inquiry demonstrated no prejudice. The case affirms that both § 2(a) and § 2(b) theories are available regardless of whether the defendant could be a traditional principal, and that specific mention of one subsection does not exclude the other.

Holdings

1. Aiding and abetting is implied in every federal indictment for a substantive offense, regardless of whether the indictment specifically charges causing or aiding and abetting. The specific inclusion of § 2(b) in the superseding indictment did not preclude the implication of § 2(a), and therefore no amendment occurred.
2. Because Armstrong did not object to the wording of the instructions on the specific grounds asserted on appeal, the court reviewed for plain error. The instructions, when read as a whole, included the statutory language and implied that someone must have committed the crime charged. Any error did not materially affect the verdict.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. The court conducted thorough evidentiary hearings and questioning of the jurors and determined that the misconduct did not affect Armstrong's right to a fair trial.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the district court erred by allowing the jury to consider aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) as an alternative theory when the superseding indictment only charged causing under § 2(b), thereby materially amending the indictment.
2. Whether the jury instructions on aiding and abetting were insufficient because they failed to distinguish between causing and aiding and abetting, specifically by not requiring the jury to find a knowing traditional principal.
3. Whether the district court erred in denying Armstrong's motion for a mistrial based on alleged juror misconduct.

Disposition

affirmed