Crawford S. Norris and Kathleen Norris v. Grosvenor Marketing Limited, R. Twinings & Co. Ltd. (U.S.A.), and R. Twining and Company, Ltd.

6 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 109 (2d Cir. 1986) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · October 27, 1986 · No. No. 24, Dockets 86-7344, 86-7372

Summary

The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants in the Norrises' diversity action arising from the termination of a tea distributorship and alleged interference with lifetime profit payments. The court held that the Norrises' claims were barred by collateral estoppel because the relevant issue had been fully and fairly litigated in a prior arbitration, and independently held that the claims were time barred. The court remanded for determination of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

Holdings

  1. New York's collateral-estoppel doctrine barred plaintiffs' claims because the dispositive issue—their alleged right to share in the continued profits of Twining's United States distributorship—was necessarily decided in the prior arbitration, and plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it.
  2. Plaintiffs' claims were barred by applicable limitations principles. Their tortious-interference claim accrued no later than April 12, 1980, and the three-year limitations period had expired before suit was filed on April 25, 1985. The fiduciary-duty and unjust-enrichment theories were also barred because plaintiffs had an adequate legal remedy that they pursued and allowed to become time barred.
  3. Rule 11 sanctions were warranted because plaintiffs' claims were patently time barred, had no chance of success under existing precedent, and were unsupported by any reasonable argument for extending, modifying, or reversing the law.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether collateral estoppel barred plaintiffs from relitigating their alleged right to participate in the future profits of Twining's United States distributorship after that issue had been litigated in a prior arbitration.
  2. Whether plaintiffs' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
  3. Whether defendants were entitled to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 because plaintiffs' claims were not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for changing the law.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (17)

  • Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1973)(followed)
  • Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969)(followed)
  • Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1978)(followed)
  • Ryan v. New York Telephone, 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500-01, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826-27, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490-91 (1984)(followed)
  • Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51, 423 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1981)(followed)
  • Goldstein v. Doft, 236 F. Supp. 730, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 353 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966)(followed)
  • Cohen v. Dana, 83 N.Y.S.2d 414, 418 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 275 A.D. 723, 87 N.Y.S.2d 614, aff'd, 300 N.Y. 608, 90 N.E.2d 65 (1949)(followed)
  • Collard v. Village of Flower Hill, 604 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 759 F.2d 205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 88 (1985)(followed)
  • Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)(followed)
  • Tillman v. National City Bank of New York, 118 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 650 (1941)(followed)

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