United States v. Chi Ping Patrick Ho

Summary

The Second Circuit affirmed FCPA and money laundering convictions, holding that an officer of a U.S. NGO can violate 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 by bribing foreign officials to assist the NGO in obtaining business for a foreign company. The court held that FCPA § 78dd-3 violations constitute specified unlawful activity for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D), and that wire transfers routed through U.S. correspondent banks satisfy the "to or from the United States" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A). The court also rejected arguments that FCPA §§ 78dd-2 and 78dd-3 are mutually exclusive and found no abuse of discretion in the admission of summary charts and out-of-court statements.

Holdings

1. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction because the statute does not require that the domestic concern be the ultimate object of the assistance; it is enough that the defendant acted on behalf of the domestic concern to assist it in obtaining business for any person. The jury could reasonably find that Ho acted on behalf of the U.S. NGO to assist it in obtaining business for CEFC Energy.
2. A violation of §78dd-3 constitutes specified unlawful activity under the money laundering statute because §1956(c)(7)(D) refers to 'any felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act' without limitation, and the plain language encompasses all felony violations of the FCPA, including those under §78dd-3 added in 1998.
3. A wire transfer that passes through correspondent banks in the United States can be covered by §1956(a)(2)(A) because the transfer involves transfers 'to' and 'from' the United States. The intermediate steps are themselves transfers to/from the US, and the statute does not require mutual exclusivity among 'to', 'from', and 'through'.
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Déby's statements as adoptive admission and background, admitting Boubker's text message as a prior consistent statement of Gadio, and admitting summary charts under Rule 1006.
5. The indictment was not repugnant and the FCPA sections are not mutually exclusive. Conjunctive pleading is permissible, and any error was harmless. The statutory language contains no indication that §§78dd-2 and 78dd-3 are mutually exclusive.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Ho's conviction under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 for acting on behalf of a domestic concern.
2. Whether a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 constitutes 'specified unlawful activity' under the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D).
3. Whether a wire transfer that passes through correspondent banks in the United States but originates and ends outside the United States goes 'to' or 'from' the United States as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A).
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting out-of-court statements by President Déby, a text message from Boubker Gadio, and summary charts.
5. Whether the indictment was invalid because it contained material contradictions and charged Ho under mutually exclusive sections of the FCPA.

Disposition

affirmed