United States v. Mingo

Summary

The Second Circuit held that SORNA's delegation to the Secretary of Defense to designate military offenses as "sex offenses" does not violate the non-delegation doctrine because Congress provided an intelligible principle through the statute's plain-language definition of "sex offense" and its declared purpose of protecting the public. The court also held that the Secretary's designation of offenses in Enclosure 27 fell within the military affairs exception to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements, as the defendant's court-martial conviction and military confinement were part of the military justice system. The conviction for failure to register under SORNA was affirmed.

Holdings

1. The delegation does not violate the non-delegation doctrine because Congress provided an intelligible principle through the plain-language meaning of 'sex offense' and the statute's declaration of purpose.
2. The Secretary's designation falls within the military affairs exception to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements, so no violation occurred.

Questions Presented

1. Whether SORNA's delegation to the Secretary of Defense to designate military offenses as sex offenses violates the non-delegation doctrine.
2. Whether the Secretary's designation of military offenses as sex offenses in Enclosure 27 violated the APA's notice-and-comment requirements.

Disposition

affirmed