Gallina v. Wilkinson

Summary

The Second Circuit denied a petition for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, holding that prolonged solitary confinement under Italy's 41-bis prison regime does not constitute "torture" under the CAT and its implementing regulations. The court found the conditions were a lawful sanction incidental to preventing organized crime, not intentionally inflicted severe pain or suffering, and that prolonged isolation without additional deliberate abuse constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment rather than torture. The opinion narrowly interprets the regulatory definition of "other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality" under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(ii) and applies substantial evidence deference to the BIA's factual findings.

Holdings

1. The BIA's finding was supported by substantial evidence. The record does not compel a conclusion that the 41-bis regime was intended to inflict severe pain or suffering; the conditions appear consistent with the legitimate penological purpose of preventing organized crime, and offers of cooperation do not indicate an intent to torture.
2. The conditions do not rise to the level of torture under the regulation. Prolonged solitary confinement is not a 'procedure' as the term is used in the regulation, and even if it were, the conditions do not meet the standard of severe mental pain or suffering envisioned by the regulation.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the BIA erred in finding that the conditions of 41-bis detention were not intentionally inflicted so as to constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture and its implementing regulations.
2. Whether prolonged solitary confinement and other conditions of 41-bis detention constitute 'other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality' under 8 C.F.R. §1208.18(a)(4)(ii).

Disposition

dismissed