Freddie Sevier v. Kenneth Turner, et al.

Summary

The Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal of Freddie Sevier’s claims arising from Tennessee child-support and civil-contempt proceedings. The court held that Sevier adequately alleged custodial interrogation and entitlement to counsel, that judicial immunity did not bar claims based on alleged nonjudicial prosecutorial acts, and that habeas relief was unavailable because he was not in custody when the federal complaint was filed. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, while abstaining from the claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief.

Holdings

1. When a court actually incarcerates a person in a civil-contempt proceeding, the person is entitled to the assistance of counsel, including appointed counsel if indigent, regardless of whether the proceeding is labeled civil or criminal.
2. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach under a Massiah theory before the July 1977 meeting because Tennessee adversary criminal proceedings commence, for this purpose, when a magistrate issues an arrest warrant, and no warrant had issued.
3. Sevier adequately alleged that he was in custody and subjected to interrogation because officials threatened to arrest him if he did not appear and sign the consent order; therefore, he adequately alleged a Miranda-based right to counsel.
4. Habeas corpus relief was unavailable because Sevier was not in custody under either the 1977 consent order or the 1981 contempt order when he filed the federal complaint.
5. The federal courts were required to abstain from deciding Sevier's declaratory and injunctive claims because he did not demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances required by Parker v. Turner.
6. Judicial immunity did not require dismissal of damages claims alleging that the defendants initiated criminal prosecutions and civil-contempt proceedings as prosecutorial or accusatory functions, because initiating such processes is not a function normally performed by a judicial officer.
7. The § 1983 damages claim against Turner and Justice arising from the July 1977 consent-order events was barred by Tennessee's one-year limitations period because Sevier knew or had reason to know of the injury when he signed the order under threats of prosecution.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Sevier adequately alleged a right to counsel at the October 1981 civil-contempt proceeding because the proceeding resulted in incarceration.
2. Whether Sevier adequately alleged a right to counsel during the July 1977 meeting with Justice under the Sixth Amendment or Miranda.
3. Whether habeas corpus relief was available under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254 to vacate the consent and contempt orders.
4. Whether judicial immunity barred declaratory and injunctive relief.
5. Whether abstention under Parker v. Turner barred the declaratory and injunctive claims.
6. Whether the defendants' alleged initiation of criminal prosecutions and civil-contempt proceedings constituted nonjudicial acts for which damages could be available.
7. Whether the statute of limitations barred the § 1983 damages claim arising from the July 1977 consent-order events.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded