Commonwealth v. Mercado

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Phillipe Mercado’s first-degree murder conviction and the orders denying his motions for a new trial and to reduce the verdict. The court held that counsel’s admission of evidence concerning Mercado’s history of violence was consistent with a reasonable strategy supporting a lack-of-criminal-responsibility defense, and that the provocation instruction was not erroneous. The court also upheld the denial of a new-trial motion without an evidentiary hearing and declined to exercise its power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Holdings

1. Defense counsel's decisions to permit or introduce evidence of Mercado's prior violent acts and mental-health history did not constitute ineffective assistance because they were part of a deliberate strategy to connect his mental illness, medication status, and inability to control violent behavior to the lack-of-criminal-responsibility defense, and the strategy was not manifestly unreasonable when made.
2. The provocation instruction was not erroneous. It properly distinguished mere insulting or abusive words, which ordinarily do not constitute reasonable provocation, from statements conveying information that could cause a reasonable person to lose self-control and actually cause the defendant to do so. In any event, the evidence did not support a provocation instruction because there was no sudden discovery of infidelity and there was a cooling-off period.
3. The motion judge did not abuse her discretion by ruling on Mercado's motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing because the motion and affidavits did not raise a substantial issue, and the judge's recollection of the trial and defense strategy enabled her to resolve the claim without supplemental testimony.
4. After reviewing the entire record, the court found no reason to exercise its extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial.

Questions Presented

1. Whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to, and in some instances introducing, evidence of Mercado's prior violent acts and mental-health history.
2. Whether the jury instruction distinguishing mere words from statements conveying information sufficient to constitute reasonable provocation erroneously defined heat of passion or reasonable provocation.
3. Whether the motion judge erred by denying Mercado's motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing.
4. Whether the Supreme Judicial Court should exercise its extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the first-degree murder verdict to manslaughter or order a new trial.

Disposition

affirmed