Kenniston v. Department of Youth Services

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that G. L. c. 120, §§ 17-19, governing extended commitment of juvenile offenders beyond age eighteen, violates substantive due process. The statute permitted continued detention based solely on the Department of Youth Services’ opinion that release would be physically dangerous to the public, without requiring a connection to mental illness, abnormality, or inability to control behavior, and without adequately defining dangerousness. The court declined to reach the reported procedural due process question and ordered entry of a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional.

Holdings

1. G. L. c. 120, §§ 17-19, violates substantive due process because it authorizes extended civil commitment based solely on dangerousness and does not require a link between the alleged dangerousness and a mental condition or defect that causes a serious difficulty in controlling behavior.
2. The statutory requirement that a juvenile be "physically dangerous to the public" is unconstitutionally vague because it supplies no guidance concerning the nature, degree, or required certainty of dangerousness and leaves the decision to unbridled discretion.
3. The court did not answer the reported procedural due process question because the statute was already unconstitutional on substantive due process and vagueness grounds.

Questions Presented

1. Whether G. L. c. 120, §§ 16-19, violates substantive due process by permitting extended civil commitment of a juvenile based solely on the department's opinion that release would be physically dangerous to the public, without requiring a link to mental illness, mental abnormality, or inability to control behavior.
2. Whether the statutory phrase "physically dangerous to the public" is unconstitutionally vague.
3. Whether the statute's extension procedure violates procedural due process and, if so, what judicial-review procedure is required.

Disposition

remanded