Commonwealth v. LaBrie

Summary

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed Kristen A. LaBrie's convictions arising from her failure to administer prescribed cancer medications to her son. The court affirmed the reckless endangerment conviction, reversed the assault and battery convictions and ordered judgment for the defendant on those charges, and reversed the denial of her motion for a new trial on the attempted murder charge. The opinion addressed the elements of attempted murder, sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Holdings

1. The elements of attempted murder are specific intent to commit murder and an overt act toward completion of murder. The Commonwealth need not prove nonachievement or noncompletion of the murder as a separate element beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. The evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant's failure to administer medication caused substantial bodily injury or serious bodily injury within the meaning of G. L. c. 265, §§ 13J and 13K.
3. Trial counsel's failure to consult a qualified independent pediatric oncologist was manifestly unreasonable and likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defense concerning her intent. The defendant was entitled to a new trial on the attempted-murder charge.

Questions Presented

1. Whether nonachievement or noncompletion of the substantive crime is an element of attempted murder that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for caretaker assault and battery based on permitting substantial or serious bodily injury.
3. Whether the jury instructions on attempted murder and the caretaker assault and battery offenses were legally correct.
4. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult an independent pediatric oncologist, by facilitating disclosure of defense expert records to the Commonwealth's expert, or by failing to present evidence concerning the defendant's history with the Department of Children and Families.
5. Whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial on the attempted-murder charge because counsel's failure to consult an independent oncologist deprived her of a substantial ground of defense concerning intent.

Disposition

other