Summary
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the three-day involuntary hospitalization period under G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b), begins when a patient is admitted to an authorized psychiatric facility, not when the patient is initially restrained or held in an emergency department under § 12 (a). The court also concluded that the record did not establish a due process violation arising from the patient's confinement and declined to decide broader constitutional challenges to emergency-department boarding.
Holdings
- The restraint, preliminary evaluation, and application process under G. L. c. 123, § 12(a), is distinct from the three-day involuntary hospitalization and evaluation period under § 12(b). The § 12(b) period begins when the patient is admitted to an authorized psychiatric facility, not when the patient is initially brought to an emergency department under § 12(a).
- As applied to C.R., the § 12(a) confinement did not violate due process because the restraint lasted no longer than necessary to locate an appropriate facility, the placement process was complicated by her need for a private room, and no less restrictive suitable location was identified.
- The court declined to decide broader constitutional questions concerning the facial validity of § 12(a) or emergency-department boarding generally because those questions were premature in this individual appeal, which was not a class action, declaratory judgment action, or facial challenge.
Questions Presented
- Whether the three-day involuntary hospitalization period under G. L. c. 123, § 12(b), begins when a patient is initially restrained or brought to an emergency department under § 12(a), or only when the patient is admitted to an authorized psychiatric facility under § 12(b).
- Whether the statutory scheme violated C.R.'s due process rights as applied to her five-day emergency-department confinement while an appropriate psychiatric placement was located.
- Whether the Supreme Judicial Court should decide broader facial or general constitutional challenges to the length of § 12(a) restraint and emergency-department boarding.
Disposition
reversed
Cases Cited (15)
- Pembroke Hosp. v. D.L., 482 Mass. 346, 348-349, 351, 353 (2019)(followed)
- Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 777, 779-780 & nn.4, 6, 784 (2008)(followed)
- Reida v. Cape Cod Hosp., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 556 (1994)(followed)
- Williams v. Steward Health Care Sys., 480 Mass. 286, 293 (2018)(followed)
- Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 119, 122 n.8 (2018)(followed)
- Matter of N.L., 476 Mass. 632, 636-637 (2017)(followed)
- Wing v. Commissioner of Probation, 473 Mass. 368, 373 (2015)(followed)
- Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. 295, 309 (2020)(followed)
- Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 35 (2009)(followed)
- Beeler v. Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 613 n.4 (1982)(followed)
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Cited In (0)
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Court Document
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