BMC West Corporation a/k/a BMC West, LLC and Julian Noe Silva v. Martha Karlson, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Joyce Angela Williams, Deceased

Summary

The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, addressed claims arising from a vehicle collision in which a BMC employee conceded negligence and BMC accepted respondeat superior liability. The court rendered judgment that the estate take nothing on its direct-negligence claims against BMC and on its exemplary-damages claim against BMC, while rejecting rendition of judgment on mental-anguish damages. It also held that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing spoliation remedies and remanded for a new trial consistent with the opinion.

Holdings

1. The estate waived recovery on negligent entrustment because the jury charge failed to submit the elements that Silva was unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless and that BMC knew or should have known of that condition, and the estate did not present conclusive evidence of those omitted elements.
2. BMC owed no duty to train Silva not to speed, to pay attention while driving, or to avoid cellphone distractions because those are commonly known dangers ordinarily incident to driving and require no special skills or knowledge beyond that expected of licensed drivers.
3. The evidence was legally insufficient to support causation for negligent supervision and negligence based on an inadequate company-wide safety policy or program because the estate's expert testimony established only a possibility, not a probability, that better supervision or safety training would have prevented the collision.
4. The evidence was legally insufficient to support breach for negligent retention because it conclusively established that Silva was a competent commercial driver and did not establish that BMC knew or should have known that he was incompetent or unfit to operate the truck.
5. The estate could not recover exemplary damages from BMC because neither asserted predicate was viable: the court rendered take-nothing judgment on BMC's direct-negligence claims, and the jury did not find that Silva was grossly negligent.
6. The evidence was legally sufficient to support the existence of compensable mental-anguish damages for Williams before her death.
7. The trial court abused its discretion by imposing a jury spoliation instruction without expressly considering lesser sanctions or finding that the case was an exceptional case warranting a death-penalty-like remedy, and by admitting spoliation-related evidence before the jury.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the estate secured or conclusively proved the elements necessary to recover against BMC on its negligent-entrustment claim.
2. Whether BMC owed a duty to train Silva regarding speeding, attentive driving, and cellphone-related distractions that are common dangers of driving.
3. Whether legally sufficient evidence supported negligent-supervision, inadequate-safety-program, and negligent-retention claims against BMC.
4. Whether BMC could be liable for exemplary damages based on its own alleged gross negligence or Silva's alleged gross negligence.
5. Whether legally sufficient evidence supported the existence of compensable mental-anguish damages.
6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a jury spoliation instruction and admitting spoliation-related evidence without expressly considering lesser sanctions or finding an exceptional case, and whether the error required a new trial.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded