Summary
The Supreme Court considered whether the United States could be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for alleged negligence by the Federal Aviation Administration in certifying aircraft and aircraft modifications. The Court held that the discretionary function exception barred the claims because the FAA certification process involved regulatory and policy-based discretion delegated by Congress. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgments for the respondents.
Holdings
- Claims alleging negligence by the FAA in certifying aircraft for commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary-function exception because the certification process involves discretionary regulatory judgments entrusted to the agency.
- The nature and quality of the challenged conduct, rather than the status of the government actor, determine whether the discretionary-function exception applies.
Questions Presented
- Whether the Federal Tort Claims Act's discretionary-function exception bars claims based on the FAA's aircraft certification and compliance-review activities.
- Whether the FAA's implementation and application of a spot-check system for reviewing manufacturers' compliance with aviation safety regulations constitute protected discretionary governmental functions.
Disposition
reversed
Cases Cited (9)
- Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)(followed)
- Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)(distinguished)
- Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955)(limited)
- United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963)(followed)
- Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957)(limited)
- Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289 (1983)(not reached)
- Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)(followed)
- Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)(followed)
- Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
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