Suttles v. Roy

75 So. 3d 90 (Ala. 2010) · Supreme Court of Alabama · May 21, 2010

Summary

The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed an interlocutory appeal involving personal-injury claims against the City of Homewood and a municipal police officer. The court held that the municipal-liability damages cap applied to claims against Homewood and the officer in his official capacity, but did not automatically cap claims against the officer in his individual capacity. It also held that the availability of State-agent immunity is ultimately a legal question for the court, although disputed underlying facts may require a jury determination, and remanded for the trial court to address the immunity issue.

Holdings

  1. Roy could state a cognizable direct claim against Suttles in his individual capacity notwithstanding her concession that the alleged conduct occurred in the line and scope of his employment. Municipal peace officers are protected by State-agent immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a) and the Cranman framework, not by the blanket State immunity afforded to sheriffs under article I, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution.
  2. The $100,000 statutory cap applies to recovery against Homewood and to claims against Suttles in his official capacity, but it does not automatically apply to a claim against Suttles in his individual capacity. The defendants failed to establish that the individual-capacity claim could be treated as an official-capacity claim subject to the cap.
  3. The availability of State-agent immunity is ultimately a question of law for the court, although disputed material facts relevant to immunity may require determination by a jury. The trial court therefore erred to the extent it held that the jury, rather than the court, would decide whether Suttles was entitled to State-agent immunity. The issue was remanded for the trial court to determine whether Suttles's summary-judgment motion established his entitlement to immunity.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Roy could maintain a direct claim against Suttles in his individual capacity even though she conceded that the conduct occurred within the line and scope of his employment as a Homewood police officer.
  2. Whether Alabama's statutory damages cap limited recovery against Suttles in his individual capacity, as well as against Homewood and Suttles in his official capacity.
  3. Whether the availability of State-agent immunity under Ex parte Cranman and its progeny is a question of law for the court or a question of fact for the jury, and whether the record established Suttles's entitlement to immunity.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (26)

  • Ex parte Hale, 6 So. 3d 452, 457 (Ala. 2008)(distinguished)
  • Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Ala. 2005)(followed)
  • Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Ala. 1994)(followed)
  • Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000)(followed)
  • Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006)(followed)
  • Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276 (Ala. 2008)(followed)
  • City of Birmingham v. Brown, 969 So. 2d 910, 916 (Ala. 2007)(followed)
  • Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 442-43, 446 (Ala. 1987)(followed)
  • Benson v. City of Birmingham, 659 So. 2d 82, 86-87 (Ala. 1995)(followed)
  • Smitherman v. Marshall County Commission, 746 So. 2d 1001, 1003-08 (Ala. 1999)(distinguished)

Showing top 10 of 26.

Cited In (0)

No citing cases on record yet.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…