Summary
The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed a jury verdict arising from sexual contact between an assisted-living caregiver and a resident with impaired mental capacity. The court held that several evidentiary rulings excluding expert testimony and evidence relevant to notice and supervision were erroneous, requiring a new trial against Red Oaks and the Reeveses. It upheld the directed verdict for Leslee Orebaugh and ruled that the fee and cost award related to joining a third-party defendant must be recalculated on remand.
Holdings
- The superior court abused its discretion by excluding DeLapp's testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to certified nurse aides and Armstrong's testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to assisted living homes and caregiver supervision.
- The superior court erred by excluding evidence concerning bruising of another Red Oaks resident shortly after Austin's shift and rumors that Austin viewed pornography at a prior workplace; the alcohol rumors and poor-job-performance evidence could properly be excluded.
- Evidence that Austin made sexual advances toward other residents was admissible to impeach his testimony that he loved Ruth, although it was not shown to be admissible to establish Red Oaks's prior knowledge.
- The superior court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Ruth's prior sexual history to the extent it bore on her mental capacity to consent.
- The directed verdict for Orebaugh was proper because the evidence did not support liability based on her role as administrator designee or her alleged recommendation of Austin.
- A separate aided-in-agency instruction should have been given because a caregiver with substantial power or authority over a vulnerable resident may create employer vicarious liability for tortious conduct outside the scope of employment.
- The jury should have been instructed to determine whether Austin was employed as a certified nurse aide at Red Oaks and, if so, whether he violated regulations prohibiting sexual misconduct with clients.
- The instruction limiting recovery to nonconsensual sexual contacts was erroneous; if the applicable standard of care prohibited sexual contact between staff and residents, damages could be assessed for all such contacts regardless of Ruth's consent.
- Filing a personal-injury action waives the physician-patient privilege as to all information concerning the plaintiff's health and medical history relevant to the issues, and relevance for discovery includes information reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The superior court retained discretion over whether to require signed medical releases.
- The $74,416 fee-and-cost award was properly vacated because only fees and costs reasonably related to adding Friedman and the resulting continuance, incurred no later than three days before the April 3, 2006 trial date, were recoverable.
Questions Presented
- Whether the superior court improperly excluded expert testimony concerning the standards of care applicable to a certified nurse aide and an assisted living home.
- Whether evidence of Austin's prior pornography-related conduct and bruising of another resident was admissible to show Red Oaks's knowledge of the risk Austin posed.
- Whether evidence of Austin's sexual advances toward other residents was admissible to impeach his testimony that he loved Ruth.
- Whether Ruth's prior sexual history was properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of her capacity to consent.
- Whether the directed verdict for Orebaugh was proper.
- Whether the jury should have received a separate aided-in-agency instruction for vicarious liability.
- Whether the jury should have been instructed that Austin could be negligent per se if he was acting as a certified nurse aide and violated regulations prohibiting sexual contact with clients.
- Whether damages were improperly limited to nonconsensual sexual contacts.
- Whether discovery could encompass all medical records relevant to Ruth's health and whether a medical release could be required.
- Whether the fee-and-cost award imposed as a condition of adding Friedman was properly calculated.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (21)
- Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 998 (Alaska 2005)(followed)
- Landers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 915 P.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (Alaska 1996)(followed)
- Estevez-Yalcin v. Children's Vill., 331 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)(followed)
- Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793-94 (1997)(followed)
- State v. White, 549 N.W.2d 676, 682 (S.D. 1996)(distinguished)
- Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 591-92 (Alaska App. 1995)(followed)
- Alaska Marine Pilots v. Hendsch, 950 P.2d 98, 108 (Alaska 1997)(followed)
- Veco, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 914-15 (Alaska 1999)(followed)
- Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76-77, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986)(followed)
- Zsigo v. Hurley Medical Center, 475 Mich. 215, 716 N.W.2d 220, 226-27 (2006)(distinguished)
Showing top 10 of 21.
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
Open PDFLoading document…