Guilford v. Weidner Investment Services, Inc.

Summary

The Alaska Supreme Court reviews consolidated appeals arising from a landlord-tenant dispute involving eviction, habitability, mold-related injuries, misrepresentation, security deposits, and attorney’s fees. The court holds that medical records reflecting treating physicians’ opinions about mold causation created a genuine issue of material fact, requiring reversal of summary judgment on the personal-injury claim. It otherwise affirms the superior court’s evidentiary rulings, collateral-estoppel determination, and allowance of emotional-distress damages for violations of Alaska’s Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, while vacating the attorney’s-fee award.

Holdings

1. The superior court erred by granting summary judgment against Guilford's personal-injury claim. Although the causal relationship between mold exposure and her alleged ailments was sufficiently complex to require medical opinion evidence, the medical records reflecting the possible opinions of treating physicians were sufficient, when viewed in Guilford's favor, to create a genuine issue of material fact.
2. The superior court properly gave preclusive effect to the district court's finding that Guilford had tendered her August 2015 rent.
3. URLTA permits recovery of non-economic damages, including discomfort, annoyance, and mental distress, for violations of the landlord's statutory duty to maintain fit and habitable premises.
4. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by allowing other tenants to testify, excluding Weidner's late-disclosed witnesses and photographs/video, or admitting the government mold publications; the challenge to the publications was also waived by inadequate briefing.
5. The superior court properly denied Weidner's motion for a directed verdict on Guilford's intentional-misrepresentation claim because the evidence and reasonable inferences permitted differing judgments by reasonable jurors.
6. A tenant's personal-injury claim arising from conditions on rented premises is a common-law tort claim rather than a claim arising under URLTA, even when pleaded as a URLTA claim; Civil Rule 82 therefore applies to fees incurred in pursuing or defending that claim.
7. The superior court erred by reducing Guilford's URLTA attorney's-fee award solely because her damages recovery was modest compared with the fees incurred.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the superior court improperly granted summary judgment against Guilford's mold-related personal-injury claim for lack of expert causation evidence.
2. Whether medical records reflecting treating physicians' possible opinions that mold exposure caused Guilford's health problems were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
3. Whether the district court's finding that Guilford attempted to tender rent was entitled to preclusive effect in the later proceeding.
4. Whether URLTA permits a tenant to recover non-economic damages for discomfort, annoyance, and mental distress caused by habitability violations.
5. Whether the superior court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from other tenants and government publications and excluding late-disclosed witnesses, photographs, and video.
6. Whether the superior court properly denied a directed verdict on Guilford's intentional-misrepresentation claim.
7. Whether a tenant's personal-injury claim arising from premises conditions is a common-law tort claim subject to Civil Rule 82 rather than URLTA's full-fee provision.
8. Whether attorney's fees under URLTA may be reduced solely because the tenant's monetary recovery was modest compared with the fees incurred.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded