Summary
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that violating A.R.S. § 28-3475, which prohibits knowingly permitting an unauthorized driver to operate a vehicle, constitutes negligence per se. The court vacated the summary judgment granted to Pinnacle Nissan and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming summary judgment for Nissan North America because the plaintiffs presented no evidence establishing an agency relationship with Pinnacle. The court also held that the plaintiffs could pursue negligent entrustment under both the statute and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a violation of A.R.S. § 28-3475, which prohibits a vehicle owner from knowingly allowing anyone to drive the vehicle on a highway who is not properly authorized to drive, constitutes negligence per se.
- Whether summary judgment for Nissan North America was proper based on vicarious liability.
- Whether summary judgment for Pinnacle Nissan was proper on negligent entrustment claim.
Holdings
- A violation of A.R.S. § 28-3475, which prohibits a vehicle owner from knowingly permitting an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle on a highway, constitutes negligence per se because the statute was enacted for the protection and safety of the public and sets a specific standard of care.
- Summary judgment for Pinnacle was improper because a jury could reasonably find Pinnacle was negligent per se in knowingly entrusting its car to Guevara, who was known to be unauthorized to drive.
- Summary judgment for Nissan was proper because Kaufman provided no evidence establishing an agency relationship between Pinnacle and Nissan.
Key quotations
“By enacting § 28-3475, the legislature prohibited owners of motor vehicles from knowingly entrusting them to unauthorized drivers.” (¶ 27)
“We therefore conclude that A.R.S. § 28-3475 was enacted for the protection and safety of the public; it sets the standard of care. And if a jury finds that Pinnacle violated the statute, that finding would constitute negligence per se.” (¶ 27)
Factual background
Christina Guevara, whose driver's license was suspended for DUI, visited Pinnacle Nissan to buy a car. She presented an Arizona identification card instead of a valid driver's license. Pinnacle sold her a car, required a co-signer who also lacked a valid license, and gave her the keys. While driving back to the dealership without a license and under the influence of alcohol, Guevara crashed into David Kaufman's car.
Procedural history
The superior court granted summary judgment to Pinnacle Nissan and Nissan North America. The appellate court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Remand instructions
Remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, specifically on the negligent entrustment claim against Pinnacle Nissan under the negligence per se theory based on violation of A.R.S. § 28-3475.