Bunker's Glass Company v. Pilkington plc; Michael R. Gray, M.D. v. Philip Morris USA Inc.

Summary

The Arizona Supreme Court considered whether indirect purchasers may bring private actions for damages under the Arizona Antitrust Act. The court held that the statute’s reference to an injured “person” permits indirect purchasers to sue and that the statute’s permissive federal-guidance clause does not require adoption of the federal rule from Illinois Brick. The court vacated and remanded the trial-court dispositions in both consolidated cases.

Holdings

1. A person who alleges injury to business or property from an Arizona Antitrust Act violation may bring an action under A.R.S. § 44-1408(B), and the statute does not limit that right to direct purchasers.
2. A.R.S. § 44-1412's federal-guidance clause is permissive, not mandatory, and does not require Arizona courts to adopt Illinois Brick's direct-purchaser limitation.
3. Potential difficulty in proving pass-on damages and avoiding duplicative recovery does not justify dismissing indirect-purchaser claims before the plaintiffs have an opportunity to prove injury.

Questions Presented

1. Whether an indirect purchaser injured by an antitrust violation may bring an action for damages under A.R.S. § 44-1408(B).
2. Whether A.R.S. § 44-1412 requires Arizona courts to follow the federal rule announced in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.
3. Whether concerns about pass-on proof, multiple liability, and complexity of damages justify barring indirect-purchaser actions at the pleading stage.

Disposition

vacated