Escamilla v. Cuello

Summary

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the disqualification of Alejandrina Cabrera from the ballot for San Luis City Council because she lacked sufficient English proficiency to perform the duties of the office without an interpreter. The court held that the challenge was properly brought as a special action, that the statutory deadline for the superior court’s decision was directive rather than jurisdictional, and that the trial court properly admitted expert linguistic testimony. The court also rejected Cabrera’s constitutional challenge and denied the request for attorney fees.

Holdings

1. A petition for special action seeking injunctive relief and an order to show cause is an appropriate procedure for challenging a candidate's qualifications for the ballot.
2. The ten-day decision deadline in A.R.S. § 16-351(A) is directive rather than jurisdictional, and a delay does not require reversal absent prejudice to a party.
3. A.R.S. § 38-201(C) requires a candidate to possess sufficient functional proficiency in English to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter; merely being able to read, write, and speak some English is insufficient without comprehension adequate to perform the office.
4. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Eggington's expert testimony because his qualifications, testing methods, interviews, and review of city-council materials satisfied the applicable requirements for expert testimony.
5. Applying A.R.S. § 38-201(C) to disqualify Cabrera did not violate the Constitution because there is no general constitutional right to seek or hold public office, and the functional English requirement serves a legitimate governmental concern.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a challenge to a candidate's ballot eligibility could properly proceed as a special action rather than as a complaint for injunctive relief.
2. Whether the ten-day decision deadline in A.R.S. § 16-351(A) is jurisdictional and, if not, whether the delay prejudiced Cabrera.
3. Whether A.R.S. § 38-201(C), read in conjunction with Arizona's Enabling Act and Constitution, requires functional English proficiency sufficient to perform the duties of the office without an interpreter.
4. Whether the superior court abused its discretion by admitting the linguistics expert's testimony.
5. Whether applying the English-proficiency requirement to Cabrera violated a constitutional right to seek or hold public office.

Disposition

affirmed