Davis v. Kelley

Summary

The Arkansas Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal of Carl Davis Jr.'s petition challenging the Arkansas Department of Correction's calculation of his parole eligibility and habitual-offender classification. The court held that applying the governing parole statutes did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. It further held that Davis's Class C felony perjury conviction could not be counted under the statutory definition of a qualifying felony, reversing and remanding on that issue.

Holdings

1. Applying Act 825's parole-classification method to Davis's parole eligibility for his 1991 aggravated-robbery conviction did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though some prior convictions used in the classification predated the Act.
2. The ADC may not include Davis's Class C felony perjury conviction in calculating his habitual-offender status because section 16-93-606(a) defines felony, for purposes of that section, as a Class Y, Class A, or Class B felony.
3. Davis did not qualify as a fourth offender under section 16-93-606(b)(4) because, after excluding the Class C perjury conviction and term, he had served only two qualifying prior terms of incarceration rather than the required three.

Questions Presented

1. Whether application of the parole-eligibility classification provisions enacted in Act 825 of the 1983 Acts of Arkansas to Davis's 1991 aggravated-robbery conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because some prior convictions predated the Act.
2. Whether the ADC properly counted Davis's Class C felony perjury conviction and its concurrent term of incarceration in determining whether he qualified as a fourth offender under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-606(b)(4).
3. Whether Davis had served the three qualifying prior terms of incarceration required for fourth-offender status.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded