In re Chunn

Summary

The California Court of Appeal reviews a Solano County standing order addressing delays by the Department of State Hospitals in admitting defendants found incompetent to stand trial and providing competency assessment and treatment. The court concludes that the order did not generally violate separation-of-powers principles or conflict with existing constitutional and statutory requirements, but that statutory amendments and intervening precedent required modification or reconsideration of some provisions. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Holdings

1. An incompetent-to-stand-trial defendant is deemed committed to DSH's care when the court serves DSH with the commitment packet required by Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(3), whether or not the packet is complete.
2. The maximum constitutionally permissible delay before commencement of substantive competency-restoration services for an incompetent-to-stand-trial defendant is 28 days from service of the commitment packet.
3. A county trial court may require DSH to provide prompt assessment, stabilization, and ameliorative treatment for severe symptoms while an incompetent-to-stand-trial defendant awaits commencement of full competency-restoration services; such a requirement does not necessarily conflict with Stiavetti's 28-day deadline.
4. The trial court did not violate separation-of-powers principles by imposing deadlines and requiring treatment plans and weekly reports designed to enforce statutory and constitutional obligations concerning incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants.
5. Sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 are limited to $1,500 per defendant or violation and may not be imposed at $1,500 per day for the same defendant.
6. The trial court could not require DSH to evaluate incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants within 72 hours where Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 grants DSH authority and sole discretion to conduct reevaluations and evaluations.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court's countywide standing order violated separation-of-powers principles by imposing deadlines, treatment obligations, treatment-plan requirements, and weekly reporting requirements on DSH.
2. Whether the standing order conflicted with Stiavetti v. Clendenin's holding that substantive competency-restoration services must commence within a maximum of 28 days after service of the commitment packet.
3. When legal responsibility for an incompetent-to-stand-trial defendant transfers to DSH.
4. Whether recent amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 precluded the trial court from requiring DSH to evaluate defendants within 72 hours.
5. Whether Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 authorized sanctions of up to $1,500 per day per defendant for violation of the standing order.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded