People v. Copeland

Summary

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed Samuel Scott Copeland’s conviction for attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness from testifying under Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2). The court held that the statutory definition of “witness” does not encompass a potential witness to a civil dispute that had not yet been filed, and that the jury instruction misstated the law in a prejudicial manner. The court therefore did not uphold the conviction on the prosecution’s theory that Copeland attempted to dissuade a prospective civil witness.

Holdings

1. In the civil-litigation context, Penal Code section 136, subdivision (2), does not define witness to include a potential future witness to a civil dispute that has not yet been filed. The definition covers persons who have given or had a declaration under oath received as evidence, who have been subpoenaed, or whom a reasonable person would believe had done one of those things. Because Wagner had not been subpoenaed and had not given a declaration under oath when the messages were sent, substantial evidence did not support the conviction.
2. The instruction defining witness to include a person whose declaration under oath 'has been or may be received as evidence' misstated Penal Code section 136's definition by adding a forward-looking category of possible future witnesses. The error was prejudicial because the prosecutor relied on the 'may be' language to argue that Copeland could be convicted based on conduct occurring before the civil case was filed.
3. The instructional-error claim was not forfeited by the failure to object because the challenged instruction was an incorrect statement of law.

Questions Presented

1. Whether substantial evidence established that Wagner was a witness within the meaning of Penal Code section 136, subdivision (2), when Copeland sent the allegedly intimidating messages.
2. Whether CALCRIM No. 2622 misstated the law by defining a witness to include a person whose declaration under oath may be received as evidence.
3. Whether the prosecution, as applied to Copeland's conduct, violated the First Amendment.

Disposition

reversed