Jung v. Acosta

Summary

The California Court of Appeal affirmed an order granting, in part, defendants’ special motions to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that disciplinary proceedings conducted by an international labor union constituted official proceedings authorized by law under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), and that plaintiffs failed to show the challenged claims had the requisite minimal merit. The opinion also upheld the trial court’s decision to consider defendant Acosta’s allegedly late anti-SLAPP motion.

Holdings

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Acosta to file his anti-SLAPP motion after the 60-day period because the motion was filed during the early stages of the litigation, Acosta had been in default and therefore could not have filed it earlier, and plaintiffs showed no prejudice.
2. An International Union judicial-panel disciplinary proceeding is an official proceeding authorized by law within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), because the proceeding was conducted under union constitutional procedures regulated by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act's due-process requirements and was subject to judicial review.
3. The alleged provision of the mediation brief and exhibits to Bigelow, their acceptance and use to prepare charges, and related conduct were in connection with the union judicial-panel proceeding and therefore constituted protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).
4. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate minimal merit for the four challenged causes of action: Alvarenga was not shown to be an intended third-party beneficiary of the mediation or settlement agreements; conspiracy cannot be based solely on breach of contract absent an independent tort; and Alvarenga's intentional-interference claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Acosta to file his anti-SLAPP motion after the statutory 60-day period.
2. Whether union judicial-panel disciplinary proceedings conducted pursuant to union constitutional procedures and regulated by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act are official proceedings authorized by law under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).
3. Whether the alleged disclosure of mediation materials before the judicial-panel proceeding was conduct in connection with that official proceeding and therefore protected activity.
4. Whether plaintiffs demonstrated the requisite minimal merit for Alvarenga's third-party-beneficiary breach-of-contract claim.
5. Whether plaintiffs demonstrated the requisite minimal merit for their conspiracy claim and Alvarenga's intentional-interference claims.

Disposition

affirmed