People v. Molano

Summary

The California Supreme Court reviews Carl Edward Molano’s convictions and death sentence for the murder of Suzanne McKenna, including a rape-murder special circumstance and prior-conviction allegations. The opinion addresses the admissibility of Molano’s statements under Miranda and Edwards, including whether he invoked his right to counsel and later reinitiated communication. The court affirms the judgment in full.

Holdings

1. A Miranda waiver is not invalid merely because police withhold the specific subject of questioning or use a noncoercive ruse, so long as the suspect understands the rights conveyed, the consequences of waiving them, and makes an uncoerced choice to speak. Molano's initial waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
2. After a suspect invokes the right to counsel, police may resume questioning if the suspect himself reinitiates communication relating directly or indirectly to the investigation and thereafter knowingly and voluntarily waives the previously invoked rights. Molano reinitiated communication at San Quentin.
3. A suspect's conditional or equivocal references to obtaining a public defender do not clearly invoke the right to counsel under Edwards. Molano's statements asking whether he could speak with a public defender first did not require questioning to cease.
4. Molano's statements at the station were properly admitted because he was re-advised of his Miranda rights, acknowledged understanding them, and voluntarily waived them. The officers' statements about the victim and Molano's family did not amount to unconstitutional coercion.
5. Evidence of Molano's prior rapes was admissible under Evidence Code section 1108, subject to section 352, and its admission did not violate due process. The court declined to reconsider its established holding in People v. Falsetta.
6. Evidence that Molano previously strangled his wife was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove intent and negate accident in the charged strangulation death.
7. Molano forfeited his claim that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct that an actual but unreasonable belief in consent could negate the specific intent required for rape felony murder or the rape-murder special circumstance. The court did not decide whether the theory was legally valid.
8. Even assuming the trial court erred by failing to instruct on an actual but unreasonable belief in consent, the error was harmless under the reasonable-probability standard.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Molano's initial Miranda waiver was invalid because investigators used a ruse and failed to disclose that they were investigating McKenna's death.
2. Whether Molano reinitiated communication after invoking his right to counsel, permitting further questioning under Edwards v. Arizona.
3. Whether Molano clearly invoked the right to counsel during transport to the police station.
4. Whether Molano's subsequent Miranda waiver was involuntary because officers used deception, ignored prior invocations, or engaged in improper softening-up tactics.
5. Whether evidence of Molano's prior rapes was admissible under Evidence Code section 1108 without violating due process.
6. Whether evidence of Molano's prior strangulation of his wife was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove intent and negate accident.
7. Whether the trial court was required to instruct sua sponte that an actual but unreasonable belief in the victim's consent could negate the intent required for rape felony murder or the rape-murder special circumstance.
8. Whether any instructional error concerning an unreasonable belief in consent was prejudicial.

Disposition

affirmed