State v. Jeffrey Z.

Summary

The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the denial of Jeffrey Z.'s motion to terminate lifetime sex-offender registration and his petition to restrict dissemination of registration information. The court held that the registration requirement was a mandatory, nonpunitive regulatory consequence rather than a negotiable term of the plea agreement, and that retroactive application of the lifetime-registration requirement did not violate due process. The court also upheld findings that the defendant's conviction involved a sexually violent offense and that he was ineligible for restricted dissemination because he had served jail time.

Holdings

1. The lifetime registration requirement did not breach any prosecutorial promise and did not violate due process because sex-offender registration is a mandatory, nonpunitive regulatory consequence rather than a negotiable sentencing term.
2. The trial court's implied finding that the defendant was convicted under § 53a-72a (a) (1), rather than the familial-sexual-intercourse exception in subdivision (2), was not clearly erroneous.
3. The trial court was not bound by decisions of another trial judge in separate cases involving the defendant's codefendants, and the requested termination remedy was unavailable under the amended statute for a person convicted of a sexually violent offense.
4. Seven weeks of presentence confinement that was credited as time served constituted jail time served as a result of the conviction under § 54-255 (c) (5) (A), disqualifying the defendant from petitioning for restricted dissemination.
5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the available 1998 violation-of-probation transcript because the defendant had notice of the transcript and an opportunity to address its contents.

Questions Presented

1. Whether lifetime sex-offender registration violated the defendant's plea agreement and due process rights under Santobello v. New York.
2. Whether the record established that the defendant's third-degree sexual-assault conviction was under § 53a-72a (a) (1), a sexually violent offense requiring lifetime registration.
3. Whether the trial court was required by horizontal stare decisis or equity to follow another judge's decisions granting similar termination motions filed by the defendant's codefendants.
4. Whether the defendant remained eligible to seek restriction of dissemination under § 54-255 (c) (5) after serving seven weeks of presentence confinement that was credited as time served.
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or violated due process by taking judicial notice of the available 1998 violation-of-probation transcript.

Disposition

affirmed