Summary
The Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether a medical services provider hired by an employer to conduct a fitness-for-duty examination owed a duty of care to the examined employee. Applying New York law under Connecticut’s most-significant-relationship conflicts analysis, the court held that the claim sounded in medical malpractice and that the provider generally had no duty to disclose the abnormal EKG. The court nevertheless reversed summary judgment because the examining physician’s statement could fall within an exception for affirmative treatment or advice, creating a fact issue.
Holdings
- New York substantive law governs the duty issue because New York has the most significant relationship to the fitness-for-duty examination and the parties' relationship.
- Dugan's claim that Mobile Medical failed to notify him of an abnormal EKG sounds solely in medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence.
- Under New York law, a physician or medical services provider retained by an employer to conduct a fitness-for-duty examination ordinarily owes no duty of care to the employee based solely on the examination; a duty may arise if the provider affirmatively treats or advises the employee as to treatment.
- Summary judgment was improper because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Keefe's statement about Dugan's EKG constituted affirmative treatment or advice and whether Dugan reasonably relied on it.
Questions Presented
- Which state's substantive law governs whether an employer-retained medical services provider owed Dugan a duty of care?
- Whether Dugan's claim sounded in medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence under New York law.
- Whether, under New York law, an employer-retained provider conducting a fitness-for-duty examination can owe a duty to the employee when its personnel affirmatively treat or advise the employee.
- Whether the physician's statement concerning Dugan's EKG created a genuine issue of material fact regarding affirmative treatment or advice sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (14)
- Lee v. New York, 162 App. Div. 2d 34, 560 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1990)(followed)
- Murphy v. Blum, 160 App. Div. 2d 914, 554 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1990)(followed)
- O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986)(followed)
- Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 359, 641 A.2d 783 (1994)(followed)
- Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 789 A.2d 459 (2002)(followed by analogy)
- Interface Flooring Systems, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 261 Conn. 601, 804 A.2d 201 (2002)(followed)
- Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563, 717 A.2d 215 (1998)(followed)
- Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 88 N.Y.2d 784, 673 N.E.2d 914, 650 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1996)(followed)
- Scott v. Uljanov, 74 N.Y.2d 673, 541 N.E.2d 398, 543 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1989)(followed)
- Twitchell v. MacKay, 78 App. Div. 2d 125, 434 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1980)(followed)
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Court Document
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