In re Jeisean M.

Summary

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the termination of the respondent mother’s parental rights to Jeisean M. The court rejected constitutional challenges to Connecticut’s termination and reunification statutes, concluding that the statutes properly permit state intervention upon clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness. It also upheld the trial court’s findings regarding the mother’s failure to achieve sufficient rehabilitation, the child’s best interests, and the court’s use of judicial notice.

Holdings

1. General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) is not facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied under the due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions when it permits termination of the parental rights of a parent shown by clear and convincing evidence to be unfit.
2. The trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation necessary to support a reasonable belief that she could assume a responsible position in Jeisean's life within a reasonable time.
3. Expert testimony is not a precondition to a trial court's factual determination that a parent has failed to rehabilitate or that termination is in a child's best interest.
4. The trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the respondent's parental rights was in Jeisean's best interest.
5. The trial court properly took judicial notice of its prior May 17, 2001 finding that further reunification efforts were no longer appropriate because the respondent was given an opportunity to be heard and the prior ruling concerned the same parties and case.
6. The respondent could not challenge the May 17, 2001 commitment-extension and reunification rulings for the first time as a collateral attack in the appeal from the termination judgment.

Questions Presented

1. Whether General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) was facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied under the federal and Connecticut due process clauses because it authorized termination of parental rights without the protections recognized in Roth v. Weston.
2. Whether the evidence, including the absence of expert testimony, supported the finding by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation.
3. Whether the evidence supported the finding that termination of the respondent's parental rights was in Jeisean's best interest.
4. Whether the trial court properly took judicial notice of its prior finding that further reunification efforts were no longer appropriate.
5. Whether the respondent could collaterally attack the prior order extending the child's commitment and determining that further reunification efforts were inappropriate in the termination appeal.
6. Whether the reunification provisions in General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) §§ 17a-111b and 46b-129 (k) (2) were unconstitutional because they did not then require a clear-and-convincing-evidence finding that reunification efforts were inappropriate.

Disposition

affirmed