State v. Aviles

Summary

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed Jose Aviles’s convictions for murder and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver. The court held that exigent circumstances justified the police’s warrantless entry into the bedroom where Aviles was staying as an overnight guest and his ensuing seizure, based on the reasonable belief that he remained armed and posed a continuing danger to public safety. The opinion also addresses, though the provided text does not reach that portion, the defendant’s challenge to the jury instruction concerning extreme emotional disturbance.

Holdings

1. The warrantless entry into the bedroom and seizure of Aviles were justified by exigent circumstances. Police had lawfully entered the apartment by consent, had probable cause to believe Aviles had recently committed a shooting, knew the murder weapon had not been recovered, and reasonably believed he might remain armed and pose a continuing danger to human life and public safety.
2. The jury instruction was not improper merely because it did not expressly list pain as a possible cause of extreme emotional disturbance. The instruction's reference to 'other similar emotions' and to overwhelming stress did not prevent the jury from considering pain.
3. The trial court should have instructed the jury that extreme emotional disturbance may develop over time and need not be sudden or spontaneous, but the omission was harmless because it was not reasonably probable that the jury was misled.
4. The jury instruction adequately differentiated the defendant's burden to prove extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence from the state's burden to prove murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also did not improperly require expert testimony.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the warrantless entry into the bedroom where Aviles was staying and his ensuing seizure were justified by exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut Constitution.
2. Whether the jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance was deficient because it did not expressly identify pain as a possible cause of the disturbance.
3. Whether the jury instruction was deficient because it did not expressly state that extreme emotional disturbance may develop over time rather than arise spontaneously.
4. Whether the jury instruction adequately explained the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and improperly suggested that expert testimony was required.

Disposition

affirmed