State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155

Summary

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's convictions for attempted sexual assault, attempted risk of injury to a child, attempted enticing of a minor, importing child pornography, and obscenity. The court held that attempted sexual assault and attempted risk of injury to a child are legally cognizable offenses and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's intent and substantial step toward committing the offenses. The court also rejected challenges concerning vagueness, jury instructions, the scope of the child-pornography statute, and expert testimony.

Holdings

1. Attempted second-degree sexual assault is a legally cognizable offense because second-degree sexual assault under General Statutes § 53a-71(a)(1) is a general-intent crime, not a strict-liability crime, and an attempt requires intent to bring about the elements of the completed offense.
2. Attempted risk of injury to a child under either subdivision of General Statutes § 53-21 is a legally cognizable offense.
3. Traveling to a prearranged location to meet a person the defendant believed to be a child, after repeated sexually explicit communications and arrangements for sexual conduct, may constitute a substantial step strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal purpose.
4. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for attempted second-degree sexual assault, attempted risk of injury to a child, importing child pornography, and attempted enticing of a minor.
5. A person who knowingly sends child-pornography images by Internet transmission to a recipient's electronic mailbox in Connecticut can import or cause the images to be imported into Connecticut under General Statutes § 53a-196c.
6. General Statutes § 53a-196c is not limited to commercial importation or to persons engaged in the pornography business.
7. The statutes defining attempted second-degree sexual assault and attempted risk of injury to a child were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant.
8. The trial court's instructions on attempt, risk of injury, importing child pornography, and obscenity were correct in law, adapted to the issues, and sufficient to guide the jury.
9. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony without a Porter hearing because the testimony concerned nonscientific specialized knowledge based on training and experience rather than scientific evidence.
10. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the expert testimony's probative value outweighed its potential prejudicial effect.

Questions Presented

1. Whether attempted second-degree sexual assault and attempted risk of injury to a child are legally cognizable offenses when the completed offenses are general-intent crimes.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for attempted second-degree sexual assault, attempted risk of injury to a child, importing child pornography, and attempted enticing of a minor.
3. Whether the statutes defining attempted second-degree sexual assault and attempted risk of injury to a child were unconstitutionally vague as applied.
4. Whether the jury instructions on attempt, importing child pornography, and obscenity were legally adequate.
5. Whether the child-pornography-importation statute applies to Internet transmissions and to noncommercial importation.
6. Whether the trial court properly admitted expert testimony concerning the characteristics of preferential sex offenders without a Porter hearing and after balancing probative value against prejudice.

Disposition

affirmed