In re William D.

Summary

The Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether the term “child” in General Statutes § 46b-141 (b) refers to the respondent’s status when the delinquency commitment was initially imposed or when an extension was sought. The court held that the term refers to the respondent’s status at the time of the original delinquency proceeding, permitting extension of the commitment even though the respondent was no longer a “child” under the statutory definition when the extension was granted. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment.

Holdings

1. For purposes of extending a delinquency commitment under § 46b-141 (b), "child" refers to the respondent's status as a child at the time of the original delinquency proceeding and commitment under § 46b-141 (a), not whether the respondent satisfies the definition of child at the time of the extension proceeding.
2. The appeal was reviewable under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the term "child" in General Statutes § 46b-141 (b) refers to the respondent's status at the time of the original delinquency commitment or at the time the court considers the motion to extend the commitment.
2. Whether the respondent's appeal was reviewable under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness.

Disposition

affirmed