Summary
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the enforceability of the parties' prenuptial agreement in a marital dissolution proceeding. The court held that the agreement was enforceable under the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act, concluding that the financial disclosure and opportunity to consult with independent counsel satisfied the statutory requirements. The court reversed the trial court's judgment.
Holdings
- Fair and reasonable financial disclosure concerns the nature, extent, and accuracy of the information disclosed about the other party's property, financial obligations, and income. It generally requires a general approximation of income, assets, and liabilities; exact or precise valuations and a written schedule attached to the agreement are not invariably required.
- The timing of a financial disclosure does not determine whether the disclosure itself is fair and reasonable under § 46b-36g(a)(3). Timing is relevant instead to whether the agreement was executed voluntarily or under duress under § 46b-36g(a)(1).
- Under General Statutes § 46b-36g(a)(4), a party need only have sufficient time before the marriage to consult with an attorney other than the attorney representing the future spouse; actual consultation or advice is not required if a reasonable opportunity to obtain it was provided.
- The prenuptial agreement was enforceable because the plaintiff received fair and reasonable financial disclosure and a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel, and the record did not establish involuntariness, duress, or fraud.
Questions Presented
- What constitutes fair and reasonable financial disclosure under General Statutes § 46b-36g(a)(3)?
- Whether the defendant provided the plaintiff fair and reasonable disclosure of his property, liabilities, and income before execution of the prenuptial agreement.
- Whether the timing of the disclosure made the agreement involuntary or otherwise rendered the financial disclosure inadequate.
- Whether the plaintiff was afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel under General Statutes § 46b-36g(a)(4).
- Whether the trial court's findings of inadequate disclosure, lack of independent counsel, and fraud were legally and factually supportable.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (14)
- Parrot v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 273 Conn. 12, 866 A.2d 1273 (2005)(followed)
- Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 662 A.2d 718 (1995)(followed)
- Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 882 A.2d 597 (2005)(followed)
- McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482, 436 A.2d 8 (1980)(followed)
- Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996)(followed)
- DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J. Super. 432, 511 A.2d 1257 (1986)(distinguished)
- In re Marriage of Bonds, In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1, 5 P.3d 815 (2000)(followed)
- Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990)(followed)
- Dornemann v. Dornemann, 48 Conn. Supp. 502, 850 A.2d 273 (2004)(followed)
- Lafayette Bank & Trust Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 177 Conn. 137, 411 A.2d 937 (1979)(followed)
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