Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission

Summary

The Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether General Statutes § 1-215 exclusively governed a law enforcement agency’s disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act during a pending criminal prosecution. The court held that a 1994 legislative amendment increased the information required to be disclosed but did not disturb the prior holding that § 1-215 exclusively governs disclosure of arrest-related records during a pending prosecution. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment upholding the disclosure of a press release rather than the broader set of requested records.

Holdings

1. General Statutes § 1-215 exclusively governs a law enforcement agency's disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act for records relating to a pending criminal prosecution. Public Act 94-246 increased the required disclosure by requiring the police blotter information and at least one additional item designated by the agency, such as an arrest report, incident report, news release, or similar report, but did not make the broader disclosure obligation in § 1-210 (a), subject to § 1-210 (b) (3), independently applicable during the pending prosecution.
2. The department satisfied its disclosure obligation under § 1-215 by providing the required police blotter information and a press release containing a sufficiently meaningful narrative about the arrest.
3. The Freedom of Information Commission's interpretation of §§ 1-215 and 1-210 (b) (3) was not entitled to judicial deference because it was unreasonable in light of the statutory text, legislative history, and the purpose of the 1994 amendment.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Public Act 94-246 amended General Statutes § 1-215 to require law enforcement agencies, during a pending criminal prosecution, to disclose records beyond the police blotter information and one additional arrest-related report or narrative, subject to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (3).
2. Whether the Freedom of Information Commission's interpretation of the relationship between §§ 1-215 and 1-210 (b) (3) was entitled to judicial deference as a reasonable and time-tested agency interpretation.

Disposition

affirmed