St. Juste v. Comm'r of Corr., 328 Conn. 198

Summary

The Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether a prior conviction for second-degree threatening constituted a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore rendered moot a habeas appeal challenging a separate assault conviction. The court held that Connecticut’s second-degree threatening statute is divisible and that the modified categorical approach applies. Because the record did not establish which statutory subdivision supported the petitioner’s conviction, the court concluded that the prior conviction could not be treated as a crime involving moral turpitude as a matter of law and reversed the Appellate Court’s dismissal.

Holdings

1. General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) is divisible because its subdivisions require different acts or mental states, and the statute encompasses both conduct that may constitute a crime involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not.
2. A conviction under § 53a-62 (a) (3), which involves reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror, does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude as a matter of law under the Second Circuit's approach because it lacks the requisite aggravating circumstance.
3. The record of conviction did not establish whether St. Juste was convicted under subdivision (1), (2), or (3) of § 53a-62 (a).
4. The uncertainty about the subdivision underlying the threatening conviction created a reasonable possibility that the challenged assault conviction produced prejudicial collateral consequences, so the habeas appeal was not moot.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the petitioner's prior conviction for threatening in the second degree under General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) categorically constituted a crime involving moral turpitude for federal immigration purposes.
2. Whether § 53a-62 (a) is divisible and therefore subject to the modified categorical approach.
3. Whether the record of conviction established the statutory subdivision underlying the petitioner's threatening conviction.
4. Whether the uncertainty concerning that prior conviction created a reasonable possibility of prejudicial collateral consequences sufficient to prevent the habeas appeal from becoming moot.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded