Neil Wallace v. MJM Golf, LLC, et al.

Summary

The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirms dismissal of Neil Wallace’s action against MJM Golf, LLC and other defendants as barred by the statute of limitations. The court holds that Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), rather than subdivision (E)(1), governs tolling after a voluntary nonsuit and that Wallace’s subsequent federal filing did not toll the limitations period because it was a legal nullity. The court resolves the appeal solely on statute-of-limitations grounds without reaching Wallace’s additional res judicata and assignability arguments.

Holdings

1. Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) governs an action recommenced after a voluntary nonsuit; a litigant may not invoke Code § 8.01-229(E)(1) to stack an additional tolling period onto the specific nonsuit tolling and grace period provided by subdivision (E)(3).
2. The federal filing did not toll the statutes of limitations because it was a legal nullity, void from inception, after the federal courts determined that the filing manufactured jurisdiction in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1359.
3. TFG was not the same plaintiff as CPM, or a recognized representative of CPM, for purposes of Code § 8.01-229(E)(3); therefore, TFG's federal filing could not toll the limitations period.
4. The remaining claims were time-barred because the federal filing did not toll the limitations periods, and Wallace filed the present action after both the applicable original limitations periods and the six-month nonsuit grace period had expired.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Code § 8.01-229(E)(3), rather than Code § 8.01-229(E)(1), governs tolling after a voluntary nonsuit and prevents stacking the two tolling provisions.
2. Whether the federal action filed by Tee Feral Golf, LLC constituted a legal nullity that could not toll the applicable statutes of limitations.
3. Whether Tee Feral Golf, LLC was the same plaintiff as CPM Virginia, LLC or a recognized representative entitled to recommence CPM's nonsuited claims under Code § 8.01-229(E)(3).
4. Whether the remaining claims were time-barred.

Disposition

affirmed