William Dean Perry, Heather Marie Perry, and Alexander M. Brauer v. Robert J. Janson, David B. Meltzer, Lacy J. Conte, Sheryl D. Crutchfield, and Stephen L. Graham

Summary

The Texas Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, reviewed summary judgments dismissing homeowners’ third-party claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and gross negligence against individual homeowners’ association board members. The court affirmed the dismissal of the IIED and gross-negligence claims but reversed the summary judgment on the negligence claim. Because of that partial reversal, the court also reversed the sanctions award of $184,607.60 and remanded for further proceedings.

Holdings

1. Summary judgment on the Perrys' IIED claim was proper because the claim was based on the same facts as their other tort claims and therefore failed IIED's gap-filler requirement. Independently, the alleged conduct did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law.
2. The Perrys' negligence claim was not necessarily an improperly recast intentional tort because some alleged intentional acts could have been performed without specifically intending to injure the Perrys.
3. The summary-judgment evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the board members' alleged conduct proximately caused Ms. Perry's medical injuries.
4. Summary judgment on the gross-negligence claim was proper because the Perrys presented no evidence that the board members' conduct involved an extreme degree of risk or that the board members were subjectively aware of and consciously indifferent to such a risk.
5. The sanctions award was reversed without consideration of its merits because the partial reversal of the summary judgment made review of the sanctions award premature. The sanctions motion was remanded for reconsideration.

Questions Presented

1. Whether summary judgment was proper on the Perrys' intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because the claim was barred by the gap-filler doctrine and the alleged conduct was not extreme and outrageous.
2. Whether the Perrys' negligence claim was improperly recast from an intentional tort.
3. Whether the summary-judgment evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact on proximate cause for the negligence claim.
4. Whether the Perrys presented evidence of the objective and subjective elements of gross negligence.
5. Whether the sanctions award should stand after partial reversal of the summary judgment.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded