Curonix LLC v. Laura Tyler Perryman

Summary

The Delaware Court of Chancery denied Laura Tyler Perryman’s motion to dismiss Curonix LLC’s second amended complaint. The court held that Perryman waived any personal-jurisdiction defense through her litigation conduct, that service was proper, and that the complaint adequately stated claims and was timely. The court did not resolve Curonix’s motion to strike because the motion to dismiss was denied on the merits.

Holdings

1. A defendant waives a personal-jurisdiction defense by failing to assert it in a timely Rule 12 motion or responsive pleading and then submitting to the court's jurisdiction through counterclaims and extended litigation conduct.
2. Dismissal is unwarranted where the record demonstrates that the defendant was properly served under the Court of Chancery Rules and applicable Delaware law.
3. The second amended complaint adequately stated claims for relief and therefore was not subject to dismissal under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6).
4. Arguments that the complaint failed to plead fraud with particularity did not support dismissal or a more definite statement because the complaint asserted no fraud claim.
5. The challenged claims were not time-barred because the claims arising from the 2017-2019 conduct related back to the initial complaint, and the malicious-prosecution claim was added within the applicable three-year limitations period.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Perryman waived her defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to assert it in her initial responsive pleading, filing counterclaims, and participating in the litigation for approximately six years.
2. Whether the claims against Perryman should be dismissed for insufficient process or ineffective service of process.
3. Whether the second amended complaint adequately stated claims for declaratory, contractual, equitable, and malicious-prosecution relief under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6).
4. Whether the second amended complaint's claims were time-barred or instead related back to the initial complaint under Court of Chancery Rule 15(c).
5. Whether dismissal or a more definite statement was warranted based on an alleged failure to plead fraud with particularity.

Disposition

denied